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QUI TAM CLAIMS – A WAY TO PIERCE THE FEDERAL POLICY ON ARBITRATION?: A 
COMMENT ON SAKKAB V. LUXOTTICA RETAIL NORTH AMERICA INC. 
By 
Lauren Picciallo* 
I.   INTRODUCTION  
 In Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit held that the 
Federal Arbitration Act § 22 (hereinafter FAA) does not preempt representative Private 
Attorneys General Act3 (hereinafter PAGA) claims.  Therefore, PAGA claims could not 
be barred by class action waivers, despite the Supreme Court holding in  AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion.4  In concluding that the FAA did not preempt PAGA, the Ninth Circuit 
held that PAGA was a generally applicable statute. A generally applicable statute is a 
statute which applies to the contract in its entirety and not solely the arbitration clause.  
Further, the Ninth Circuit found that the PAGA claims did not conflict with any of the 
fundamental principles of the FAA, including enforcing the intent of the parties and the 
efficiency of arbitration. Lastly, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that PAGA, although 
containing similarities to class action arbitration, was critically different from class 
arbitration in that the suit was in essence a qui tam suit brought on the behalf state.  
II.   BACKGROUND 
Shukri Sakkab, Plaintiff,  was an employee of Lenscrafters, formerly known as 
Luxxotica Retail North America, Inc. (hereinafter Luxottica).5 On January 17, 2012, 
Sakkab filed a putative class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of California alleging “(1) unlawful business practices, (2) failure to pay 
overtime compensation, (3) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and (4) 
failure to pay wages when due.”6 The basis of the allegations arose from Luxxotica’s 
classification of Sakkab and others as supervisors to exempt them from overtime wages 
and time for meal and rest breaks.7   
                                                
*Lauren Picciallo is member of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2017 Juris Doctor 
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 427-28 (9th Cir. 2015). 
2 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925). 
3  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2698 (2004). 
4 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (finding that statutes which conflict with 
the enforcement of the FAA are preempted by the FAA). 
5 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 427-28. 
6 Id. at 427. 
7 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 427. 
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On March 27, 2012, Sakkab added a PAGA cause of action to the complaint.8  
PAGA “authorizes an employee to bring an action for civil penalties on behalf of the 
state against his or her employer for Labor Code violations committed against the 
employee and fellow employees, with most of the proceeds of that litigation going to the 
state.”9 On April 23, 2012, Luxottica filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the 
arbitration agreement.10 The agreement provided:  
You and the Company each agree that no matter in what capacity, 
neither you nor the Company will (1) file (or join, participate or 
intervene in) against the other party any lawsuit or court case that 
relates in any way to your employment with the Company or (2) 
file (or join, participate or intervene in) a class-based lawsuit, court 
case or arbitration (including any collective or representative) 
arbitration claim).11   
Sakkab argued that the PAGA claims could not be arbitrated because he should not be 
denied a forum for the representative PAGA claims, and the arbitration agreement 
prohibited him from bringing class actions.12  On the other hand, Luxxotica argued that 
the FAA preempts California law, specifically the FAA preempts the Iskanian rule;13 
therefore, the representative PAGA claim would be barred pursuant to the arbitration 
agreement.14 The district court granted the motion to compel arbitration on all counts.15 
The district court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,  to find that the FAA would preempt the PAGA claims.  
III.   COURT’S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit started the analysis by setting forth the laws at issue in the 
case.16 The laws included the Private Attorneys General Act, Iskanian v. CLS 
Transportation Los Angeles, LLS, and the FAA.17  
                                                
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 429. 
10 Id. at 428. 
11 Id. 
12 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 428. 
13 Id. at 429. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 429. 
17 Id. at 429-33. 
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The Ninth Circuit set forth that the PAGA was enacted to correct two perceived 
flaws in the California Labor Code.18 The first flaw, the Ninth Circuit stated, was that no 
civil fines were available to citizens for certain Labor Code violations.19 The only redress 
for a violation had been criminal sanctions, available to be prosecuted by the district 
attorneys.  Therefore, many victims of violations were left uncompensated.20  Hence, 
PAGA was enacted to provide another redress for Labor Code violations.21 As a result of 
bringing a  PAGA action, California imposed civil penalty damages, the proceeds of 
which would be divided between the private individual, and the rest to the California 
government.22  
Further, PAGA provides another monetary redress, if a suit for a violation would 
not otherwise provide for compensation.23 Specifically, “PAGA provides that the 
penalties are generally $100 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial 
violation and $200 per pay period for each subsequent violation.”24  Therefore, the 
PAGA class action may heighten the penalty to make the suit economically worthwhile. 
The second flaw that PAGA redressed was the shortage of government 
resources.25  Even though PAGA afforded the government civil penalties, “there was a 
shortage of government resources to pursue enforcement.”26 As set forth by the 
legislature of California, the loss to the state’s government from unprosecuted violations 
amounted to a tax loss of “three to six billion dollars annually.”27 Further, the negative 
effect that PAGA was aimed to redress included “33,000 serious and ongoing wage 
violations,” by the garment industry, but the state was only able to indict 100 per year for 
all industries.28 
Next, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the California Supreme Court’s holding in 
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, which found that PAGA waivers are 
prohibited in agreements because such a waiver would be in violation of two provisions 
of the California Civil Code.29 First, the Iskanian court found that a PAGA waiver would 
be in violation of California Civil Code § 1668, which states that agreements that would 
                                                
18 Id. at 429. 
19 Id. 




24 Id. at 429. (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(f)(2)). 
25 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 429. 
26 Id. at 429-30. (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(f)(2)). 
27 Id. at 430. 
28 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 430. 
29 Id. at 430-31 (discussing Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014)). 
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exculpate a party from a violation of law are unenforceable.30 The California Supreme 
Court reasoned that allowing PAGA to be waivable would be negating one of the primary 
mechanisms for Labor Code enforcement.31 Further, the California Supreme Court 
reasoned that since an agreement which waives PAGA suits would avoid law 
enforcement, such an agreement would be “against public policy” and “may not be 
enforced.”32 The second provision that a PAGA waiver would violate is Civil Code § 
3513, which sets forth that a law established for a public reason may not be contravened 
by private agreement.33 Such a waiver would harm the state’s public interest in 
“enforcing the Labor Code” and receiving “proceeds of civil penalties used to deter 
violations.”34 Lastly, the Iskanian Court held that although that case concerned an 
individual agreement, agreements to waive representative PAGA claims would be 
unenforceable, as well.35 
A.  The Iskanian Rule is a Generally Applicable Rule. 
Next, the Ninth Circuit set forth the controlling law in the Federal Arbitration Act. 
Typically, the FAA preempts state law “to the extent that it ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Further, 
the only way to invalidate an arbitration clause under FAA § 2, is by a showing of 
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”36  In 
order to be a “generally applicable” rule, the rule must not “single out arbitration 
agreements”37 and must put arbitration agreements on “equal footing.”38 Further, if a state 
rule is “generally applicable” to contract law, the rule is preempted if it conflicts with the 
FAA.39 
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit briefly mentioned the Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility, 
LLC v. Concepcion.40 There, the United States Supreme Court held that the “FAA 
preempted [a] California law providing that class action waivers in certain consumer 
                                                
30 Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 148. 
31 Id. at 149. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 149. 
35 Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 155. 
36 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011). 
37 See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
38 Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 at 687. 
39 AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1748. 
40 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 433. 
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contracts of adhesion were unconscionable and unenforceable.”41 The Court found that 
the law was preempted by the FAA, though the law was “generally applicable” to all 
contracts, because it “conflicted with the purposes of the FAA.”42  
 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the issue rests on whether the Iskanian rule is 
“generally applicable” and whether it conflicted with purposes of the FAA.43 Because the 
Iskanian rule prevents any waiver of PAGA claims, and not just a waiver that occurs as a 
result of an arbitration clause, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the rule is “generally 
applicable.”44  
B.  The Iskanian Rule Does Not Conflict with the Principles of the FAA. 
Due to the holding in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit looked to 
whether the principles of the FAA conflict with the Iskanian Rule.45 As stated by the 
Ninth Circuit, the principle reason the FAA was enacted was to defeat the judicial 
hostility toward arbitration.46  Thus, state laws prohibiting arbitration in specific types of 
claims are preempted.47 As the Iskanian rule only finds that agreements to waive 
representative PAGA claims are unenforceable, and does not express any preference 
regarding whether individual PAGA claims are  litigated or arbitrated, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the Iskanian rule does not prohibit the arbitration of any type of claim.48  
Another purpose of the FAA is to “enforce the terms of arbitration agreements.”49  
According to the Ninth Circuit, applying the FAA to all terms, no matter whether the 
terms are within the FAA § 2 savings clause, would negate any meaning held by the 
clause.50 The savings clause states that an agreement to submit to arbitration “shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.”51  The Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress could 
not have intended to strip the savings clause of all meaning.52  Rather, Congress intended 
                                                
41  Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 433 (citing AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1748-53). 
42 AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1748. 
43 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 433. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 431. 
46 Id. at 433. 
47 Id. 
48 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 433. 
49 Id. 
50 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 434. 
51 Federal Arbitration Act, § 2. 
52 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 434. 
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that the FAA preempt only generally applicable contract defenses that interfere with 
arbitration.53 
The Ninth Circuit looked to AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion to find which  
generally applicable contract defenses may interfere with arbitration.54 In AT&T Mobility, 
the state law was found to be unenforceable because the law interfered with the 
contractually desired arbitral procedures.55  Specifically, the law in AT&T Mobility 
“provided that class action waivers in certain consumer contracts of adhesion were 
unconscionable.”56 However, according to the United States Supreme Court, such a rule 
would impose “classwide arbitration procedures on the parties against their will”57 and in 
essence restrict the parties’ freedom of contract. Further, the Ninth Circuit recognized 
that the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility observed that “the switch from bilateral class 
arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes 
the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedures of class 
arbitration because the procedures were required to protect the due process rights of 
absent parties.”58 
The Ninth Circuit, however, distinguished PAGA claims from class action suits.59 
While class action suits are procedural devices for resolving the claims of absent parties, 
PAGA actions are the equivalent of a federal qui tam suit.60 Here, a qui tam suit is a 
mechanism which encourages employees to file suits regarding labor code violations on 
the government’s behalf.61  PAGA suits, unlike class actions, are penalties an “employee-
plaintiff may recover on behalf of the state.”62Also unlike class actions, PAGA 
arbitrations “do not require the formal procedures of class arbitrations.”63  Further, no due 
process protections for the “absent employee” are present, as the PAGA claimant is 
merely a “proxy” of the state.64 
                                                
53 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 434. 
54 Id.  at 434-35 (citing to AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct.. at 1745). 
55 Id. at 434-35. 
56 Id. at 434 (citing to AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1755). 
57 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 435 (citing AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1745). 
58 Id. (citing AT&T Mobility, 563 S.Ct. at 1751). 
59 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 435. 
60  Id. at 435. 
61 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 435 (an employee brings the PAGA suit “as the proxy of agent of the state’s labor 
law enforcement agencies,” as such, the proxy may “obtain civil penalties for violations committed against 
absent employees.”). 
62 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 435. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 435-36 (other differences include the fact that other employees may not opt out of a PAGA action, 
no inquiry into the counsel’s ability to represent other absent employees is made, no requirement as to 
“numerosity, commonality, or typicality”). 
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 The majority opinion found the dissent incorrect in concluding that AT&T 
Mobility requires a court to enforce all waivers of representative claims.65 The essential 
issue was not whether a rule interfered with the parties’ freedom to limit arbitration, as 
the dissent claimed.  Rather, the majority stated that the essential issue is whether the  
procedures which the statute or rule prohibits interfere with arbitration.66 The  Ninth 
Circuit concluded against finding that the rule interfered with arbitration, as the 
individual employee brings suit on behalf of the government and not all other 
individuals.67  
The Ninth Circuit also found that the mere fact that the civil penalties would be 
greater does not mean that the FAA would preempt the Iskanian rule.68 Neither would the 
FAA preempt PAGA claims if the arbitration agreement specifically stated that PAGA 
claims were waived.69 Additionally, the FAA does not require courts to enforce 
agreements which waive representative PAGA actions because the penalties an aggrieved 
employee would recover under formal procedures of litigation are more attractive than 
arbitration’s informal procedures.70 
The Ninth Circuit suggested that the representative PAGA claims would not make 
arbitration more “costly” and “slower.’71 The Ninth Circuit analogized PAGA claims 
with other claims that are more complex, such as antitrust claims, that would make 
arbitration more costly.72 However, such complexity does not mean that “a rule declining 
to enforce waivers of such claims interferes with the FAA in any meaningful sense, since, 
unlike class claims, parties are free to arbitrate them using the procedures of their 
choice.”73 Any “procedural morass” is thus the parties’ choice.74  In conclusion, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the agreement did not set forth whether the parties would choose to 
arbitrate or litigate PAGA claims.  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit remanded the issue to the 
district court.75   
                                                
65 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 436. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 437. 
69 Sakkab 803 F.3d at 437 (citing Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc, 413 F.3d 77, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2005), which 
found that an agreement that waived punitive damages during arbitration would be unenforceable as 
applied to the District of Columbia Human Rights Act). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 438. 
72 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 438. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 440. 
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IV.   SIGNIFICANCE 
This case is significant because the Ninth Circuit allowed an alternative to an 
absolute waiver of a representative suit, despite an arbitral agreement containing a class 
action waiver. In practice, PAGA claims have many similarities to class actions, as the 
Ninth Circuit set forth.76  Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a party cannot 
waive a PAGA claim via an arbitration clause.  
Courts have already used the holding in Sakkab to enforce a PAGA claim. For 
example, in Zackaria v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California held that despite the court’s order of a waiver of class action claims 
in the contract, the Plaintiff is not thereafter barred from instituting a PAGA suit.77  In 
coming to such a conclusion, the court relied in part on Sakkab, specifically the holding 
that PAGA claims are akin to qui tam actions, rather than class action suits.78  Other 
courts have had to decide on similar issues.79 
Whether other courts will similarly hold that parties cannot waive representative 
qui tam claims via a waiver of class arbitration should be an interesting development in 
arbitration, the consequences of which may have significant legislative impact. For 
example, state legislatures may be able to enact statutes that enable qui tam claims for 
other violations that the state does not have enough resources to litigate. The State could 
theoretically enact qui tam claims for state tax violations, environmental law violations, 
or labor code violations, for example. The plaintiff thus may have the ability to sue where 
he or she would not have otherwise, due to the cost of arbitration.80  
Further, the Sakkab holding is significant because of the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and class actions. The Ninth Circuit held 
that AT&T Mobility merely set forth that a “law providing that class action waivers in 
certain consumer contracts of adhesion were unconscionable and unenforceable, was 
preempted by the FAA.”81  Further, the Ninth Circuit found that AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion  held that class arbitration was unenforceable if parties waived class action 
arbitration in the contract, as to enforce otherwise would be in violation of the freedom to 
                                                
76 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 437 (in both class actions and PAGA claims in arbitration there would be limited 
opportunity for review and Defendants may face “hefty” civil penalties). 
77 Zackaria v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2015 WL  6745714 * at 1-11 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
78Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 429. 
79 See Kag West, LLC v. Malone, No. 15-cv-03827-THE, 2015 WL 6693690 at *3 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (citing 
Sakkab for support in the conclusion that the arbitrator would have to decide not only the “forum for 
litigation, but also must determine “the intent of the parties with regard to the arbitration clause and PAGA 
claims); Ridgeway v. Nabors Completion & Production Services Co., No. CV 15-03436 DDP (VBKx), 
2015 WL 597545 at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that a PAGA claim cannot be waived under an 
arbitration clause’s waiver of class actions);  but see Brown v. American Airlines, Inc., CV 10-8431-AG 
(PJWx) 2015 WL 6735217 * 5 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that a PAGA claim is denied are unmanageable 
except for inaccurate wage statement claims).  
80 AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct at 1760 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In general agreements that forbid the 
consolidation of claims can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon their claims rather than to litigate.” ). 
81 AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct.  at 1746.  
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select informal procedures.82   These holdings effectively limit AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, as the case could have been more expansively interpreted to bar any law 
which limits a parties choice of process, including the limits that PAGA may place on the 
streamlined arbitral hearing.83   AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, could additionally be 
interpreted so as to bar any claims that would limit the party’s freedom of contract to 
choose who can be a part of the arbitral agreement.84 PAGA claims, contrary to the Ninth 
Circuit’s reading of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, could limit a party’s freedom of 
contract because the PAGA claim mandates the participation of the state, a party which 
was not in the original arbitral agreement.  
V.   CRITIQUE  
Whether the Supreme Court would have reached the same conclusion as the Ninth 
Circuit is questionable. The Sakkab decision seems to be a break away from freedom of 
contract in that the Ninth Circuit does not enforce the arbitration agreement according to 
the terms of the contract.  
First, the Ninth Circuit held that the parties have a choice to arbitrate or litigate 
representative PAGA claims but the parties cannot waive them altogether by 
incorporating a class action waiver. Further, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the 
representative PAGA claims could not be waived by a class action waiver because the 
party is bringing the suit on behalf of the state. However, the state was never a part of the 
agreement.  Therefore, freedom of contract is abridged because the state is stepping in to 
control a private contract.  Similarly, the court recognized that the parties likely did not 
expect the enforcement of PAGA claims pursuant to their agreement.85 Nevertheless, the 
Ninth Circuit found that PAGA claims cannot be waived and therefore that the claims can 
either be litigated or arbitrated.  
Effectively, the Ninth Circuit has gone awry of freedom of contract in three 
respects: (1) although the court admitted that the parties likely intended the PAGA claim 
to be within the class action waiver, it found that the PAGA still can be brought; (2) the 
court enforced the PAGA claims on the behalf of the state, even though the state is not a 
party to the contract; and (3) the court allowed the alternative of litigation despite the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate all disputes arising from the employment. In contrast, the 
Supreme Court consistently protects the parties’ freedom of contract and strives to 
enforce the intent of the parties with regard to the arbitral clause, even if doing so would 
                                                
82 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 435 (citing AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1751). 
83 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1748 (2011) (“The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident 
in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms 
so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”).  
84 Id. at 1748-49 (parties may agree to “limit with whom a party will arbitrate its disputes.”). 
85 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 437 (“We recognize that Sakkab and Luxottica likely expected the waiver of 




deter a claim from being arbitrated.86 Likewise, the Supreme Court has never made the 
alternative of litigation available to arbitration waivers that essentially impede the 
bringing of a suit.87    
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit broke from the reasoning of the Supreme Court in two 
other respects. Part of the majority’s reasoning was the importance of PAGA claims to 
the state of California in prosecuting violations of the Labor Code.88 However, other 
claims in the past, have been deterred due to the class action waiver, despite the 
importance of the statute.89 Another reason the court found that representative PAGA 
claims cannot be waived is that the claims do not have an effect on the parties’ ability to 
choose the arbitral procedures. However, the same can be said about class action. In class 
action waivers, the parties are still able to choose the extent of discovery, the number of 
arbitrators, whether arbitrators are to write a statement of reasons, et cetera; however, 
according to the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility, class actions can be waived.  
VI.   CONCLUSION  
The Ninth Circuit, in Sakkab v. Luxottica, has interpreted AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, narrowly, thereby allowing the arbitration of PAGA claims despite a class 
action waiver. Further, the Ninth Circuit, while finding an equitable outcome for the 
litigation of PAGA claims by allowing the parties to choose whether to arbitrate or 
litigate the claims, strays from the doctrine of freedom of contract which has been relied 
upon by the Supreme Court’s decisions on arbitration. Lastly, the Sakkab holding has the 
possibility of being applied in other legislative settings.
                                                
86 Id.  
87 American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013) (“No contrary 
congressional command overrode the overarching principle, reflected in the text of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA), that arbitration was a matter of contract, as would require the court to reject merchants' waiver 
of class arbitration in their contract with charge-card issuer, which waiver the issuer sought to enforce with 
respect to merchants' federal antitrust claims against issuer; even if costs for merchants to individually 
arbitrating their antitrust claims exceeded potential recovery for each merchant, federal antitrust laws did 
not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim or evince an intention to 
preclude a waiver of class-action procedure, and congressional approval of the federal rule of civil 
procedure allowing class proceedings did not establish an entitlement to class proceedings for the 
vindication of statutory rights”) (emphasis added); AT&T Mobility, 562 U.S. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“In general agreements that forbid the consolidation of claims can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon 
their claims rather than to litigate.”). 
88 Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 430 (“Our conclusion that the FAA does not preempt the Iskanian rule is bolstered 
by the PAGA’s central role in enforcing California’s labor laws.”). 
89 See American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013) (finding that 
although the waiver may deter antitrust claims, which have importance in preventing price fixing, the class 
action waiver should be enforced).  
